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Abstract 
This paper will discuss the structure and operation of section 7 of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act (NZBORA). This will include the initial development of NZBORA, and the 
theory behind rights safeguards.  
 
I will then examine possible improvements and alternatives to New Zealand’s existing 
rights safeguards. This will include a discussion of judicial review, parliamentary 
scrutiny, human rights select committees, and policy making processes, specifically the 
potential of Human Rights Impact Statements as part of the policy process.  
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Act 
 
A  Introduction 
 
Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (NZBORA) requires the Attorney-
General to vet any bill introduced to the House of Representatives for human rights 
implications. I propose to discuss the structure and operation of s 7 of the NZBORA. This 
will include the initial development of the NZBORA, and the theory behind rights 
safeguards. I will then examine possible improvements and alternatives to New Zealand’s 
existing right safeguards. This will include a discussion of the effectiveness and potential 
of judicial review, parliamentary scrutiny, human rights select committees, and human 
rights impact statements as part of the policy process.  
 
B Background.  
 
The intent of the NZBORA is to restrain the power of government. As noted in the White 
Paper on the Bill of Rights for New Zealand in 1985 (prior to the introduction of MMP1)  
 
“The power of government…is enormous. In some senses it can be compared with 
the power, claimed as well as actual, of the Stuart Kings before the revolution of the 
seventeenth century. The basic difference between now and then is of course the 
electorate. But the electorate role cannot, in the usual case, be focused on a precise 
issue. A general election is a blunt instrument. It cannot give judgment on particular 
issues.”2 
 
Therefore it was considered a priority to create a clear a legislative protection against 
human rights abuses, particularly by the executive. A Bill of Rights was one of the 
policies set out in Labour’s 1984 election manifesto.3 The original concept included the 
Treaty of Waitangi and was entrenched. Geoffrey Palmer notes in Bridled Power that the 
journey between the policy announcement and the passing of the NZBORA was not an 
  
1 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) at 266.  
2 A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper, A.6 Appendices to the Journal of the House of 
Representatives, Wellington, 1985 at 27.  
3 New Zealand Labour Party, The New Zealand Labour Party 1984 Policy Document, (Standard Press 
Limited, Wellington, 1984) at 64.  
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easy one.4 He states “the argument of a Bill of Rights was put forward before the 1984 
election campaign in a series of speeches. Although Labour MPs showed no great 
enthusiasm for the concept then or later, there was a political market for it.”5 This was 
brought about by the constitutional high-handedness of the Muldoon government, and the 
events of the Springbok tour.6 The events of the early eighties had instilled a sense of 
unease in middle class New Zealand. There was a wariness of the power of the executive, 
and what it might be used for.7 
 
The issue of entrenchment and giving the judiciary the power to ‘strike out’ legislation 
was examined at select committee. Giving power to the unelected judiciary was not a 
popular suggestion with the public.8 This is a very interesting point that we will return to 
later. Essentially the public chose the protection of politicians over that of the judiciary.  
Other points raised include: 
 
• A Bill of Rights that is judicially enforceable creates greater inequality, as the 
poor do not have access to remedies in the same manner as the well off.9 It is 
worth noting that this will influence how a legal rights develop, as large 
companies would have the means to effectively enforce their rights and the 
average citizen would not.  
 
• It would create uncertainty in the law, as some acts would be repugnant to the Bill 
of Rights and stuck out. This would also increase litigation.10 
 
• There are better checks and balances available than a Bill of Rights. For example, 
an upper House.11 
 
These points highlight some of the unintended consequences of codifying rights, and 
serve as an important reminder that the best-laid plans of mice and men often go awry.12 
 
  
4Palmer and Palmer, above n 1 at 266.  
5 Palmer and Palmer, above n 1 at 267.  
6 Palmer and Palmer, above n 1 at 267.  
7 Palmer and Palmer, above n 1 at 267.  
8 Palmer and Palmer, above n 1 at 269.  
9 Palmer and Palmer, above n 1 at 269.  
10 Palmer and Palmer, above n 1 at 269. 
11 Palmer and Palmer, above n 1 at 269. 
12 Robert Burns, To a Mouse, on Turning Her Up in Her Nest with the Plough. 
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The National Party opposed the entrenchment of the NZBORA. They also opposed the 
bill as it was enacted.13 This made things difficult, because constitutional change requires 
cross party support to be effective.  
 
However a compromise was found between the different points of view. The Treaty of 
Waitangi was removed. Parliament would retain the ability to pass laws inconsistent with 
the NZBORA. Section 7 was created, so the Attorney-General would report to Parliament 
when a bill was inconsistent with the NZBORA, and Parliament would be aware of this 
before it passed such legislation.14  
 
Section 7 states that:  
 
Where any Bill is introduced into the House of Representatives, the Attorney-General 
shall,— 
(a) In the case of a Government Bill, on the introduction of that Bill; or 
(b) In any other case, as soon as practicable after the introduction of the Bill,— 
bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any provision in the Bill that 
appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill 
of Rights.15 
 
The function of section 7 is to alert the House of Representatives to possible rights 
inconsistencies at an early stage of the legislative process. The House then decides 
whether this inconsistency is acceptable, and makes changes if necessary. Therefore all 
enacted inconsistencies are theoretically a result of an informed and conscious choice by 
Parliament.16  
 
C Theory  
 
Rights are not absolute. They must be limited. Protected rights will conflict with one 
another.17 It seems trite to state, but it is impossible to anticipate all the circumstances or 
  
13 Palmer and Palmer, above n 1 at 270.  
14 Palmer and Palmer, above n 1 at 270.  
15 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 7.  
16 Paul Fitzgerald Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: a very practical power or well 
intentioned nonsense (1192) 22 VUWLR at 136.  
17 Janet L Hiebert A Hybrid Approach to Rights? An Argument in Favour of Supplementing Canadian 
Judicial Review with Australia’s model of Parliamentary Scrutiny 26 Fed. L. Rev. 115 1998 at 119.  
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nuances of who and what will need to be protected. This is essentially the purpose of 
judicial review, to remedy the unjust application of a general law to an individual 
circumstance. And judicial discretion in this area requires judges to consider issues of 
social policy in a way that they normally leave to Parliament. Essentially the strength and 
the weakness of judicial review are one and the same, which makes analyzing it mostly a 
matter of personal opinion on the concept and fundamental nature of rights, Parliament 
and the judiciary, truth, justice, with a dash of your opinion on humanity thrown in for 
good measure. We shall persist anyway.  
 
Rights foundationalists work on the assumption that scholars with a commitment to 
fundamental human rights believe that ‘the whole point of having rights is to trump 
decisions rendered by democratic institutions that may otherwise legislate for collective 
welfare.’18 Dworkin is also of this highly idealistic frame of mind, conceptualising rights 
to be trumps over political decisions.19 Dworkin put forward a theory of great earnestness 
about the potential of a Bill of Rights to change the culture and make up of the legal 
profession. In A Bill of Rights for Britain he states that: 
 
 “If British judges began to create as well as follow constitutional 
jurisprudence…Law and lawyers might then begin to play a different, more 
valuable role in society than they now even aim to have. The courts, charged with 
the responsibility of creating from the Convention a distinctly British scheme of 
human rights and liberty, might think more in terms of principle and less in terms 
of narrow precedent. University law courses and faculties might develop in the 
same direction, trying to produce a legal profession that could be the conscience, 
not just the servant, of the government and industry. Different men and women 
might then be tempted to the law as a career, and from their ranks a more 
committed and idealistic generation of judges might emerge, encouraging a further 
cycle in the renaissance of liberty.”20  
 
 
He is also making a very interesting point about cultural change and general fitness to 
make final decisions. If a profession is fine and upstanding, then they attract fine and 
upstanding people to it. The wider the appeal the more representative the profession will 
become.  
  
18  Bruce Ackerman We the People: Foundations (Belknap Press, Massachusetts, 1993) at 11-12. 
19 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977) at 269. See also R Dworkin, “Liberalism” in S 
Hampshire (ed) Public and Private Morality (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978) at 136.  
20 Ronald Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain (Chatto & Windus, London, 1990) at 22-23.  
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This also raises the interesting issue of the public’s perception of politician’s fitness to 
protect rights. Whilst the general population certainly doesn’t hold the principles of 
politicians in high esteem, it was demonstrated through the process of enacting the 
NZBORA that the public preferred not to give the final word to the judiciary, instead 
preferring it lay with the politicians. While the principles of politicians may not be held in 
very high esteem, at least they can be voted out of office.  
 
When discussing the theory behind judicial review, it is important to brief raise the issue 
of entrenchment. Entrenching rights has the effect of putting them out of the reach of 
general political debate and revision. A good example of this is the right to bear arms in 
the Constitution of the United States of America. A right decided upon in 1791 is now 
amazingly difficult to alter in the face of an increasing number of errant gunmen. This is 
a particularly interesting example as the sentiment behind this part of the US Constitution 
was heavily influenced by the British rights protections of the time. However the manner 
in which the British protected the same right allowed a more malleable view that benefits 
society, whereas the President of the United states recently noted that "we are the only 
advanced country in the world that sees these shootings every few months."21 Britain 
does not have anywhere near the level of gun violence the United States does. This is a 
stark reminder that the protection of a right can have disastrous consequence. It also 
highlights the importance of rights protections being able to evolve along with a 
civilisations social advancement. 
D The Relevance of Section 5 
 
The operation of s 7 often requires an inquiry under s 5 to form a substantial part of any 
report filed. Section 5 of the NZBORA allows for the rights protected in the Act to have 
“reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.”22 This is important for the Attorney-General’s reporting function 
under s 7. When considering whether it is necessary to file a report, the Attorney-General 
considers firstly whether the bill in question is consistent with the rights and freedoms in 
the NZBORA. In the event that it is not, the Attorney-General then considers whether the 
limitation is justifiable in a free and democratic society.23  
  
21 Barack Obama “Statement by the President on the Shootings at Umpqua Community College, Roseburg, 
Oregon” (James S. Brady Press Briefing Room, The White House, Washington DC, October 1 2015).  
22 Section 5.  
23 Section 5.  
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The Court of Appeal set out some guidelines for the s 5 inquiry in Moonen v Film and 
Literature Board of Review.24 The Moonen inquiry requires: 
 
  Firstly, the identification and assessment of the objective of the limitation. 
The objective must be significant enough to justify a limit on the right. 
  Secondly, the identification and assessment of the rational and 
proportionate connection between the objective and the limitation.25  
 
The provision must limit a right as little as possible.26 There must be an established 
rational link between the limitation and the objective. And the limitation must be 
proportionate to the objective. The Legislative Advisory Committee Guidelines note that 
“A wide variety of evidence is able to be considered under the Moonen inquiry, including 
empirical evidence and research. The Court of Appeal has held that social, legal, moral, 
economic, administrative, ethical and other considerations may be relevant to the inquiry 
under section 5.”27 This is a board and wide ranging inquiry enabling the Attorney-
General to take into account almost anything that that he or she sees fit. It also acts as an 
interesting guide of what could or should be considered when limiting a right.  
 
1 The concept of  “reasonable limitation” on a right 
 
The concept of a reasonable limitation on a right clearly needs some explaining least we 
all slip into a sense of cynical pragmatism. Rights generally conflict with one another. At 
some point freedom of expression becomes hate speech. Or to put it in a slightly more 
visceral manner, your right to swing your fist end where my nose begins.28 
 
E The Scope of the Attorney-General’s Section 7 Duty 
 
  
24 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [1999] NZCA 329.  
25 Moonen, above n 24.  
26 Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Lee Kwong-kut [1993] 3 All ER 939 (PC) at 954 . 
27 Legislative Advisory Committee Legislative Advisory Committee Guidelines (May 2001) at 117.  
28 Variations on this concept have been attributed to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. John Stuart Mill, and 
Abraham Lincoln.  
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There have been some questions as to the scope of the Attorney-General vetting duty. R v 
Poumako established that section 7 applies strictly as stated.29 Reports are to be made on 
introduction for government bills and as soon as practicable for others. The Attorney-
General’s s 7 duty does not apply to later amendments, for example to changes made by 
Supplementary Order Paper or at select committee. This is a potential area for 
improvement.  
 
In Boscawen v Attorney General it was argued that the Attorney-General’s duty is a 
continuous one.30 The appellant argued for a purposive interpretation of s 7, claiming the 
purpose of the s 7 report is to alert the House to any draft legislation that is inconsistent 
with the NZBORA, and therefore the duty must apply to the whole of the legislative 
process. The Court of Appeal did not accept this argument. It was stated that: 
 
It may well be that there is a case to argue that s 7 should require the Attorney-
General to report at other stages in the legislative process. But, as Clifford J 
correctly observed, s 7 is clear and unambiguous in its terms. Purposive 
interpretation does not extend to rewriting the statute book ... In the present case, 
s 7 not only imposes the duty, but says when it must be performed (on the 
introduction of the Bill). A bill can be introduced only once. That means that the 
duty arises only once.31 
 
The effect of this is that a bill may be substantially altered at select committee or by 
Supplementary Order Paper, so much so that a bill may become inconsistent with the 
NZBORA during the legislative process. If this happens the House has no formal 
mechanism to alert it to the fact that there are inconsistencies. It is also important to note 
that the minister in charge of a bill has the ability to amend it through Supplementary 
Order Paper. Therefore it is theoretically possible that an aspect of a bill that has the 
potential to cause political embarrassment could be deliberately not included in the earlier 
versions. A minister’s Supplementary Order Paper could then be put forward at the end of 
the process, minimising the amount of attention drawn to it, limiting parliamentary debate 
on the subject, and avoiding the need for the Attorney-General to file a report on the 
inconsistency. It is important to note that Supplementary Order Papers lodged by a 
minister in charge of a bill have precedence over other member’s Supplementary Order 
Papers, they are debated first and once amended a section cannot be revisited.32 This 
  
29 R v Poumako [2000] 2 NZLR 695; (2000) 17 CRNZ 530; (2000) 5 HRNZ 652  (CA) at [96] 
30 Boscawen v Attorney-General [2009] NZCA 12; [2009] 2 NZLR 229; (2009) 8 HRNZ 734.  
31 At 12.  
32 Standing Orders of The House of Representatives 2014, SO 308(2)(a).  
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process is open to abuse. It is also in principle wrong. For example, when changes were 
made to the right to protest at sea by Supplementary Order Paper to the Crown Minerals 
(Permitting and Crown Land) Bill in 2013, the human rights implications of curtailing the 
right to protest were not vetted by the Attorney-General. The issue is not whether this 
was an appropriate circumstance to limit a right, and more that it should not be possible 
to do so without proper public debate.33 
F Operation 
 
The procedural requirements relating to s 7 of the NZBORA are detailed in the Cabinet 
Manual and the Standing Orders of the House. When considering whether a s 7 report is 
required, both the Ministry of Justice and the Crown Law Office may provide advice.  
 
The Cabinet Manual requires that at the policy approval stage ministers in charge of the 
bill must certify to Cabinet that their legislative proposals comply with the relevant rights 
standards.34 I believe a more robust assessment should be integrated into the policy 
development process.  
 
2 Justiciability 
 
Section 7 reporting function is not justiciable. The Court of Appeal held in Boscawen v 
Attorney-General that “the Attorney-General’s exercise of statutory power under s 7 of 
the NZBORA was non-justiciable by virtue of art 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 and the 
principle of comity between the Courts and Parliament.35 The High Court held the same 
view in Mangawaro Enterprises Ltd v Attorney-General fifteen years earlier.36 Article 9 
prevents parliamentary proceedings from being impeached or questioned in the courts.37 
This is based on the comity principle.38  
 
G General NZBORA Remedies  
 
  
33 I am indebted to the Hon David Parker for raising this point with me.  
34 Cabinet Office, Cabinet Manual 2008.  
35 Boscawen, above n 30 at [3].  
36 Mangawaro Enterprises Ltd v Attorney-General [1994] 2 NZLR 451 (HC).  
37 Bill of Rights 1688 (Eng) Interregnum art 9.  
38 Boscawen, above n 30 at [36].  
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It was held in Simpson v Attorney-General (commonly referred to as Baigent’s Case) that 
remedies are available for a breach of the NZBORA. The Human Rights Act 1993 
created a Human Rights Review Tribunal.39 There is a general ability for individuals who 
feel their rights have been breached to lodge a complaint with the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee as part of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.40  
Human Rights Act s 92J allowing courts to issue a declaration of inconsistency with the 
rights and freedoms contained in the NZBORA.41 For example Taylor and Attorney-
General of New Zealand held that the jurisdiction to make declarations of inconsistency 
with the NZBORA arose out of “an extension of the Baigent reasoning from which it is 
said that Parliament has assigned to the courts the task of crafting effective remedies for a 
breach of NZBORA.”42  
 
It is important to note the wider context in which human rights are protected in the New 
Zealand legal system. Whilst there is clear room for improvement in the protection of 
human rights as part of the legislative process, the duty to protect human rights is a broad 
issue that is the responsibility of the whole of the legal system, not just the narrow area of 
legislative processes.  
1 Canada 
 
It is important to briefly outline the situation in Canada. Their legal system is in many 
ways very similar to ours, but they have chose to protect rights in quite a different way. 
Like the US, Canadian courts may refuse to apply legislation that is contrary to their 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.43 However the Charter also has a provision for 
legislation to enacted “not-withstanding” the Charter.44 The public commitment by 
politicians to human rights that came about through passing the Charter has increased the 
politics costs to governments of ignoring rights implications.45 This has changed the 
culture around human rights in their system of governance. This is a highly desirable 
  
39 Human Rights Act 1993, s 93.  
40 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (Opened for signature 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976). 
41 Mai Chen Public Law Toolbox (2nd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2014) at 16.58.  
42 Taylor v Attorney-General of New Zealand [2014] NZHC 1630 at [50].  
43 Jeremy Waldron The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review 115 YL.J. 1346 at 1355.  
44 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
45 Janet L Hiebert A Hybrid Approach to Rights? An Argument in Favour of Supplementing Canadian 
Judicial Review with Australia’s Model of Parliamentary Scrutiny 26 Fed. L. Rev. 115 1998 at 127.  
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outcome and worth bearing in mind as a positive by-product of public conversation on 
the subject.  
 
In Canada the Minister of Justice has a statutory obligation to report to the House of 
Commons any inconsistencies with the Charter in any bill or regulations. The Charter has 
required new systems to be put in place in their Department of Justice. They now have a 
human rights section, which functions as a centre for lawyers and public servants.46 Each 
government department also has lawyers who specialize in advising on potential Charter 
issues.47  
 
Canada’s Supreme Court assesses legislative inconsistencies under the Charter in two 
stages. Firstly, is the rights infringed. And if so, is the restriction a reasonable one?48 
Section One of the Charter specifically allows that rights can be subject to “such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.”49 This is very similar to our reasonable limitation provision in s 5 of 
the NZBORA.  
 
H Influential Factors 
 
There are some factors, which through practical process or pressures will increase the 
levels of compliance with the NZBORA. It is important to note that these factors can be 
manipulated when convenient to either increase or decrease the pressure on the 
government.  
 
1  The fourth estate 
 
This is a highly variable factor. Human rights breaches are an easy target for journalists 
looking for a story. Media coverage will be reliant on the concerns of the media at the 
time. As noted earlier, the Attorney-General is also a government minister, and the 
pressure not to generate unfavourable media coverage must be immense. However the 
pressure to make a bill compliant with the NZBORA in the first instance is also 
  
46 At 123.  
47 PJ Monahan and M Finkelstein, ‘The Charter of Rights and Public Policy in Canada” in PJ Monahan and 
M Fikelstein (eds), The Impact of the Charter on the Public Policy Process (1993) at 10.  
48 Hiebert, above n 45 at 120.  
49 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, above n 44 at s 1.  
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considerable. It is also important to consider the changes taking place in the media, and 
how this may affect the fourth estate’s ability to hold the government to account. The 
news is becoming an increasingly multimedia based platform. Journalists use Twitter, 
sometimes to draw attention to issues that for a variety of reasons will not be published in 
a newspaper. A lack of public funding has resulted in increasingly commercialized new 
outlets. This extended beyond just advertising, to an attempt to make the news ‘saleable’. 
Now that news is available online during the day, people do not have to wait until the 
next morning for the newspaper. But this also means that as the news must be ‘saleable’ 
the newspaper is essentially compromised of the stories that received the highest online 
traffic the day before. The flow of effect of this is ‘click bait’ stories being produced by 
journalists, who angle is being influence by the necessity of packaging the story in an 
accessible manner. The lack of public funding has also decreased the financial ability of 
the media to engage in investigative journalism, which is expensive and time consuming. 
All of these factors hinder the media’s ability to effective hold the government to 
account. It has also contributed the rise of leaked digital material, in cases like that of 
Julian Assange, Edward Snowden and in New Zealand the leaks that contributed to Nicky 
Hager’s Dirty Politics.  
 
2  Advice 
 
The Cabinet Manual states “The Ministry of Justice is responsible for examining all 
legislation for compliance with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and advising the 
Attorney-General. The Crown Law Office examines bills developed by the Ministry of 
Justice.” The Cabinet Manual states that ministers must confirm that a proposed bill is 
consistent with the NZBORA when seeking a place for it on the government’s legislative 
programme.50  This happens prior to receiving approval for the introduction of a bill to 
the House.  
 
The advice received by the Attorney-General from the Ministry of Justice is then made 
public on the Ministry of Justice website. Boscawen v Attorney-General notes that while 
the Attorney-General can theoretically claim legal professional privilege and not publish 
the advice, this is not a common occurrence.51 Essentially this is a voluntary 
transparency.  
 
  
50 Cabinet Manual, above n 34 at [7.62].  
51 Boscawen, above n 30 at [15]. 
The Structure and Operation of Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
 
12 
 
3  The Legislative Advisory Committee 
 
The Legislative Advisory Committee Guidelines also provide that “all submissions for 
Cabinet Committees, prepared by government departments on policy and legislation, 
from May 2003, are required to include a statement of the proposal’s compliance or non-
compliance with both the Bill of Rights Act and the Human Rights Act.”52 This is an 
interesting flow on effect of s 7 NZBORA. There is a political incentive to encourage 
compliance to avoid negative publicity. So as government bills are drafted, there is a 
conscious effort to give effect to the scheme in such a way that does not interfere with the 
NZBORA. This prevents inconsistencies from occurring, or needing to be litigated for 
clarity at a later date. This is arguably a more valuable safeguard than a public report of 
non-compliance with the NZBORA. It is important that human rights are raised prior to 
the introduction of a bill to the house, as will be discussed in greater detail later.  
 
I Politics and Other Problems 
1  The position of the Attorney-General 
 
In short, the Attorney-General has conflicting dual roles. An Attorney-General provides 
objective legal advice to the government in his or her capacity as principal law officer. 
He or she is also a government minister, in a political role. It is important to note that the 
decision to file a report is at the discretion of the Attorney-General.53 This situation is 
problematic. Attorney-General is put in a difficult position as a government minister who 
files a discretionary report saying that a government bill unreasonably limits a right. This 
is at least in part a process-based issue. The process makes is unnecessarily complex to 
declare a bill non-compliant. The issue needs to be addressed much earlier in the process, 
and in a less political fashion.  
 
Janet Hiebert in her paper A Hybrid Approach to Protect Rights discusses the inherent 
conflict between the objective obligations of a person assessing whether a right should be 
limited, and the sense of party loyalty.54 She is making an assessment in respect of 
members of a committee assessing rights, as opposed to the Attorney-General, but the 
essential issue strikes me as the same. Both situations require a politician to put aside the 
  
52 Legislative Advisory Committee Legislative Advisory Committee Guidelines (May 2001), at 111.  
53 Mangawhai Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Assn Inc v Kaipara DC [2014] NZHC 1147, [2014] 3 NZLR 85.  
54 Above n 45 at 127.  
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interests of their party and attempt an objective assessment of another person’s rights. 
She notes that “the task of having to wear two hats…is particularly difficult for 
government members. As members of the governing party, they may have a strong sense 
of political history of a proposed bill and are sensitive to the government’s intents and 
objectives.”55 
 
By convention the Attorney-General is essentially left to do whatever they think is right. 
Any suggestion of bias in their capacity of principal law officer would be regarded with 
extreme gravity, both by the general public and by other public office holders. In practice, 
any sustained level of bias would draw the attention of public office holders, the media 
and then the public. However there should at least be a formal provision allowing the 
Attorney-General to abstain from voting on a bill that is non-complaint, in order to 
mitigate the conflicting roles.56 
2  Discretionary reporting 
 
As mentioned earlier, the decision to file a report is at the discretion of the Attorney-
General. It is “not a general reporting obligation, it arises only when the Attorney-
General considers there is something to report.”57 In Boscawen v Attorney-General it was 
noted that “the objective of s 7 is to ensure that Parliament has the benefit of the 
Attorney-General’s assessment. There may be room for different views, but the view 
which Parliament is to be provided with is the genuinely held view of the Attorney-
General.”58 The court recognized that “opinions can legitimately vary on human rights 
issues” and the Attorney-General is only obliged to provide the House with his or her 
opinion.59 The duty is to report back on legislation which “in the principal law officer’s 
view, would be in breach of the rights contained in Bill of Rights.”60 As a check on the 
power of the legislature, this provision certainly does not appear to have teeth. However 
it is possible to argue that it is the nature of s 7 that the report will be the subjective view 
of one person. Its purpose may not be to prevent breaches, merely to make the Attorney-
General’s personal opinion of them a matter of public record.  
 
  
55 Hiebert, above n 45 at 127.  
56 I am indebted to the Hon Margaret Wilson for raising this point.  
57 Mangawhai, above n 53 at 13.  
58 At [20]. 
59 At [18]. 
60 At [19].  
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This means that whilst the role of the Attorney-General is generally to provide the 
government with objective legal advice, in this particular case it may be possible that the 
nature of the report does not require objectivity, and there is nothing legally wrong with a 
biased report, or no report at all if that suits the purposes of the government.  
 
J Potential Improvements  
1 Change  
 
Essentially we need to optimize the convenience for politicians to produce policy and 
eventually legislation that supports rights. This is why changes need to be better 
integrated into the existing system. Ideally a system should be designed to make it very 
easy to produce good legislation. Rights considerations would be integrated into the 
process so they are factored in as a matter of course with minimal effort required on the 
part of the government. They system should make deviating from the process complex 
and politically embarrassing. This can be helped by a culture change around the way the 
public and media perceive politicians responsibilities around rights.  
 
A improved model of pre-legislative scrutiny would be an effective solution. The reason 
for this is at least in part pragmatic. This is the area in which change is the most 
realistically achievable.61 There are political costs involved with legislative change in this 
area. It requires buy in from the public and a certain measure of cross party support. The 
fact of the matter is that in New Zealand’s current political atmosphere there is very little 
political gain to be had for improving upon our existing system. The benefits of 
comprehensive rights analysis on policy and legislation are broad and diffuse, and 
therefore difficult to quantify. They are impossible to reduce to a media sound bite. 
Unfortunately given the current prevalence of ‘sound bite politics’ this is problematic. 
The media don’t like to pick up issues that are not easy to create a sound bite from. 
Politicians are less likely to pick up issues the media won’t carry. The public doesn’t 
know or doesn’t care. Therefore in this particular situation the appropriate mode of 
operation will not be sweeping widespread change, but a measured response in keeping 
with the structure and principles of the existing system. The important issue is identifying 
  
61 Simon Evans Improving Human Rights Analysis in the Legislative and Policy Processes 29 Melb. U. 
Rev. 665 2005 at 666.  
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the point within the existing system that can be altered to have the maximum effect on the 
rest of the process.  
 
Ideally changes made to the policy-making process in a cautious manner would likely 
encounter little opposition. There is the potential to preface changes with a commission 
or inquiry on the subject. Given the choices made in jurisdictions like Canada and 
England, it is relatively likely that any report resulting from an inquiry would suggest 
something more radical such as a Canada’s Charter or strengthened judicial review. 
Therefore making a few process-based changes might appear as a suitable compromise 
between the extremities of the hypothetical report and our current system.  
 
2 Section 3(a) – it’s the vibe 
 
It may be possible to argue that s 3(a) provides that the actions of the Executive 
(including policy development) must be guided by the ‘vibe’ of NZBORA. The 
guidelines note that: 
 
“Section 3(a) of the Bill of Rights Act states that the Bill of Rights Act applies in 
respect of all acts done by the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of 
government. As Ministers and their departments form the core of the Executive, the 
Bill of Rights Act will apply to most, if not all their activities, whether that is in the 
form of legislative and policy development or in the delivery of services.”62  
 
So there is a legislative provision for the consideration of rights issues within the policy 
development process. The issue is not the principled consideration of whether it should 
be included in the process, but the lack of framework within the process to allow the time 
and personnel for the consideration of human rights issues.  
 
This means change could be achieved with any legislation being passed through 
Parliament. If legislative license was needed s 3(a) would suffice, and it could simply be 
framed as changes in the policy process to give better effect to s 3(a). It would even be 
possible under s 3(a) to argue that these changes to policy processes are necessary. At 
present there is the opportunity to consider human rights when developing policy. But it 
is possible to argue that the existence of optional guidelines followed by a brief statement 
  
62 Ministry of Justice, NZ. Guidelines on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: A Guide to the Rights 
and Freedoms in the Bill of Rights Act for the Public Sector (2004).   
The Structure and Operation of Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
 
16 
 
in a Cabinet paper does not amount to the appropriate application of the NZBORA in 
policy development. It is specifically stated that the NZBORA applies in respect of policy 
development, yet our systems to ensure this remain woefully inadequate. 
3 Integration 
 
It is important that rights checks are well integrated into the policy development process. 
By the time a bill is introduced to Parliament it is too late to change very much without 
considerable political embarrassment. Changes need to happen much earlier in the 
process, so the government is not left between a rock and hard place amending a bill they 
have invested a lot of political capital in, or ignoring reports of inconstancies in order to 
save face.  
 
There are good reasons for restricting a right, but a badly managed system is not one of 
them. Rights considerations need to be integrated into the policy process so they function 
with a certain inevitability, and hopefully invisibility. Once a bill has been introduced to 
Parliament the government already has a significant political investment in the bill. We 
need to make sure that problems are ironed out prior to the government becoming 
significantly invested in it. Hopefully rights considerations, if made obvious early in the 
process, may actually influence which policies a government does or does not choose to 
adopt.  
 
We must assume a government that wants to restrict a right can and will. However 
dubious policy may be redeemed by good legislative drafting that gives effect to the 
policy without restricting a protected right. New Zealand has the potential to create a 
process that would make it both hard and politically embarrassing for a government to 
pass laws that unreasonably restrict rights. But pressure must be applied strategically, at 
the stage that will cause maximum impact. Introducing a bill to the House with the 
support of the government is not the ideal moment to consider human rights implications, 
and from a political strategy perspective it is disastrous. It must happen earlier in the 
process, when the policy or concept is malleable enough that it can be turned into 
something that does not unnecessarily restrict protected rights.  
 
In her article Human Rights Act 2004; A New Dawn for Rights Protection? Elizabeth 
Kelly make the point that institutionalized statement of compatibility with human rights 
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are most effective at the beginning of the policy process.63 She goes on to say that this 
work will be invisible to practitioners and the public, but it is arguably where the biggest 
impact will be felt.64 This sentiment was also observed in a discussion paper, written by 
and independent evaluation team, released by the then Associate Minister for Justice 
Margaret Wilson in 2000: 
 
“If taken into account early in the policy making process, human rights tend to generate 
policies that ensure reasonable social objectives are realised by fair means. They 
contribute to social cohesion and, as the Treasury's Briefing to the Incoming Government 
(1999) observes: 'Achieving and maintaining a sense of social cohesion and inclusion is 
an important aspect of welfare in the broadest sense ... Fairness to all parties involved 
extends both to the processes by which things are done and to the outcomes themselves. 
Social cohesion is low when individuals or groups feel marginalised.' Policies which 
respect and reflect human rights are more likely to be inclusive, equitable, robust, durable 
and of good quality. Critically, such policies will also be less vulnerable to domestic and 
international legal challenge.”65 
 
The crux of this point is that human rights analysis makes better policies. Not just better 
in terms of not infringing protected rights, but analysis of this kind requires a more 
general consideration of the greater social good in a potential policy. It requires big 
picture thinking, a conscious effort is made to give effect to a scheme in a way that is 
beneficial to citizens. While we would hope this happens anyway, it is simply human 
nature that considerations would generally be those that are immediately obvious to a 
public servant or politician engaged in policy-making activity. What does the Minister 
want, what are other countries doing in this area, how do we frame it so it is easily 
drafted, easily passed, easily packaged for (or hidden from) the media? Enabling high-
level considerations in the analysis process will result in better policies.  Also as noted 
above, it is more stable. Good policies are hard to criticize and hard to change. 
Governments all advocate for social change and improving methods of governance, 
however much they may disagree on the best method of achieving this. A change in the 
policy process can help them achieve this in a lasting manner, ensuring their political 
legacy is well respected.  
 
K Where Do Policies Come From? 
 
  
63 Elizabeth Kelly, ‘Human Rights Act 2004; A New Dawn for Rights Protection?’ (2004) 41 AIAL Forum 
30 at 33.  
64 At 33.  
65 Re-evaluation of the Human Rights Protections in New Zealand (11 August 2000), Beehive 
<http://www.beehive.govt.nz> at [206] and [207].  
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  Well when a politician and a lobby group love each other very much… 
 
Policy comes from a wide range of scources. Potential origins include think tanks, policy 
committees of political parties, government departments and lobby groups. In order to 
become government bill, a policy must be adopted by the government of the day who will 
then send it to the appropriate ministry for development.  
 
As it stands, public servants who are developing policy have some guidance in the form 
of a document titled Guidelines on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Once a 
policy is presented to Cabinet, the associated Cabinet papers are required to include an 
analysis of potential rights implications. There is also a risk analysis requirement during 
the development process that has the potential to raise human rights issues. However risk 
analysis is a very broad undertaking. It does not require specific consideration of human 
rights issues, and even when they are raised they are easily be overwhelmed by more 
immediate political issues.  
 
While it is important to acknowledge the existing systems in place, and the value of them, 
I do not believe this goes far enough. As noted above good human rights make for good 
policy. These issues need to be formally addressed in a comprehensive fashion prior to 
Cabinet sign off.  A system must be clearly integrated into the policy development 
process, not handed out to the legal department to be rubber stamped prior to Cabinet.  
1 In support of Human Rights Impact Statements 
 
There is a strong argument to be made for implementing Human Rights Impact 
Statements (HRIS) in the same manner that Regulatory Impact Statements (RIS) are used, 
creating a framework that can be applied from the start of the policy making process.  
This formalised framework would improve the efficacy of the existing rights 
consideration within the policy-making process. 
 
As noted by the Simon Evans in his paper Improving Human Rights Analysis in the 
Legislative and Policy Processes, Human Rights Impact Statements are a “logical 
extension of the commitment...to evidence based policy-making.”66 They promote a 
culture of awareness of human rights in the executive branch of government.67 He notes 
the particular importance of integrating the human rights analysis within the existing 
  
66 Evans, above n 60 at 665. 
67 At 665. 
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policy process. His observations are about the Australian system, but much of what he 
says is applicable to the New Zealand system as well. We too relegate human rights 
concerns to the end of the process.  
 
Human Rights Impact Statement would be required for all policy proposals that make 
have a significant direct or indirect effect on human rights.68 Borrowing Simon Evans 
outline, a HRIS would: 
 
1 identify the problem or issues which may give rise to the need for action; 
2 identify the desired objective or objectives of the action; 
3 identify the policy instruments that might be employed to achieve the desired 
objective or objectives; 
4 include an assessment of the human rights impact of each option; 
5 identify the extent of the consultation with those who will be affected by the proposed 
action and summarise their views; 
6 identify and give reasons supporting a recommended option; and 
7 describe a strategy to implement and review the recommended option.69  
 
Essentially a HRIS would function the same way as a RIS, its structure would be the 
same, and the content would simply be human rights instead of economic impact. The 
significance criteria that trigger the need for a RIS could be adapted for a HRIS. 
 
And frankly, if we can do it for economic impact, it is a sad reflection on the priorities of 
a government that won’t do it for human rights.  
 
There is also the option of having HRIS’s reviewed by an external body.70 This is also a 
suitable alternative to having Members of Parliament sit on committees that assess the 
human rights implications, as discussed below. This body has the advantage of being 
independent. It would increase the level of political accountability. This body would not 
need to have any final power. It would not disrupt the existing system at all, or alter the 
balance we have in place. Parliament would still be free to pass any law it felt restricted 
rights in a reasonable manner. But there would be an independent report which comments 
on the effectiveness and impartiality of HRIS’s. This would increase the public’s 
confidence in the existing institutions.  
  
68 Evans, above n 60 at 686.  
69 At 678 
70 At 693.  
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L Judicial Review  
1 A theoretical argument considering Dworkin and Waldron  
 
Ronald Dworkin is a prominent defender of judicial review.71 Dworkin believes in 
judicial review as the modern vehicle for “intractable, controversial and profound 
questions of political morality that philosophers, statesmen, and citizens have debated for 
many centuries.”72 Jeremy Waldron believes judicial review is a ‘deviant institution’ in 
democracy.73 In his paper The Core Case Against Judicial Review Waldron states that 
judicial review is “politically illegitimate, so far a democratic values are concerned by 
privileging majority voting among a small number of unelected and unaccountable 
judges, it disenfranchises ordinary citizens and brushes aside cherished principles of 
representation and political equality in the final resolution of issues about rights.” 
 
It is important to note that Waldron’s despise is limited to strong judicial review, ie the 
striking down or non-application of legislation by the courts.74 This is demonstrated in 
some European courts, and in America.75 He also considers Canada included, their 
override provision allowing the legislature to exempt certain statutes from the judicial 
review of the courts notwithstanding.76 In New Zealand courts cannot decline to apply 
legislation, though they may “strain to find interpretations that avoid the violation.”77 
This is ‘soft’ judicial review.  
 
2 The tyranny of the majority 
 
The basic premise of the concept of the ‘tyranny of the majority’ is that democratic 
legislatures which are by virtue of their democratic nature organized on a majoritarian 
basis, may give expression to the “tyranny of the majority.”78  
 
  
71 Jeremy Waldron The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review 115 YL.J. 1346 at 1349.  
72 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Harvard University 
Press, Massachusetts, 1996) at 74.  
73 Waldron, above n 71 at 1349.  
74 At 1348-9.  
75 At 1355.  
76 At 1355.  
77 At 1355.  
78 At 1395.  
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Dworkin argues that majoritarian decision-making is inherently tyrannical.79 He argues 
that respect for rights is a fundamental condition for the legitimacy of any system of 
political decision-making.80 His premise is that democratic procedures are legitimate only 
among people who respect one another’s rights.81 Dworkin’s argument is not logically or 
ethically wrong, but it is abstract, so much so that is it difficult even to distil an 
overarching principle that could be applied to human rights safeguards.  
 
Waldron attempts to refute Dworkin’s position by differentiating between ‘decisional 
majorities” and ‘topical majorities’.82 Decisional majorities are quite self-explanatory. 
They are the majority of the group of people who make a decision on a right. A topical 
majority is the group of people whose rights or interests are at stake.83 He states that if 
topical majorities align with decisional majorities then we do in fact have legitimate 
grounds for concern.84 However he claims that it is striking how rarely this happens.85 He 
then goes on to provide two examples: abortion and affirmative action.86 His reasoning is 
stated thus: 
 
“In neither case is there the sort of alignment that might be worrying. Many women 
support abortion rights, but so do many men; and many women oppose them. Many 
African-Americans support affirmative action, but so do many members of the white 
majority; and many African-American’s oppose affirmative actions.”87 
 
Here Waldron is essentially missing his own point. Any person, regardless of 
demographic, could hold any personal position on a right. That argument is verging on 
that of Schrödinger’s cat. Just because a person appears to belong to a certain 
demographic doesn’t mean they’ll hold the opinion that benefits that demographic. But 
this argument doesn’t take into account the self-interested of humans. The issue is that the 
decisional majority is made up of people who are unlikely to be personally affected by 
either access to safe and legal abortions, or the help of affirmative action. The majority of 
decision makers in decisional majorities are straight white men, regardless of whether 
  
79 At 1399.  
80 Dworkin, above 72 at 25.  
81 At 25.   
82 Waldron, above n 70 at 1401.  
83 At 1401.  
84 At 1401.  
85 At 1401. 
86 At 1401. 
87 At 1401. 
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you believe the legislature or the judiciary should have the final word. Ironically, that is 
actually the purpose of affirmative action, to improve the representation of minorities in 
decisional majorities.  
 
Waldron’s argument is also so abstract it doesn’t apply to any real political system. He 
attempts to validate it by setting some baseline assumptions about the functionality of a 
democracy.88 However he sets the bar too low. For example he believes that assumption 
of a general commitment to rights in a society is easily satisfied by the existence of a bill 
of rights.89 However logic is only as good as its premise. Whilst this assumption clearly 
includes the state of modern governance in New Zealand, the United States, Canada and 
England, one assumes he is not taking into account the state of human rights in England 
in 1688 when they passed their Bill of Rights. Or the issue of slavery in the United States 
1864 when the Thirteenth Amendment made slavery unconstitutional.90 Clearly more is 
needed than the existence of a Bill of Rights. Whilst this is an extreme example, it is 
necessary to highlight the fundamental issue. Waldron’s assessment is highly abstract. 
His logic, while excellent, blithely ignores the realties of human nature and its 
predisposition towards self-interest.  
 
3 Practical concerns 
 
Proposing a Bill of Rights has attracted some concern about the effect this may have on 
political responsibility.91 The argument is that enabling judicial review of codified rights 
lessens politician’s responsibility to undertake potentially controversial political 
decisions, instead making them the responsibility of the judiciary. This would mean that 
politicians could operate with different priorities and values, knowing that doing the 
‘right’ thing is now take care of by another arm of government. On a similar note, it can 
be argued that rights claims as presented in courts are not distinct from policy 
considerations.92 This particular concern is well demonstrated in the Canadian system, 
where the judiciary actually reviews the executive’s policy making as a means to 
determine whether rights are adequately protected.93  
  
88 For further discussion of this, please refer to Jeremy Waldron The Core of the Case Against Judicial 
Review 115 YL.J. 1346 for reasons of space, it will not be discussed in detail here. 
89 At 1401.  
90 Us Const. amend. XIII.  
91 Hiebert, above n 45 at 115. 
92 Hiebert, above n 45 at 116. 
93 Hiebert, above n 45 at 122. 
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The alterative argument is that judges are not subject to the pressure of electoral and party 
politics, and therefore their decision-making will be based on principle not policy or 
partisan considerations.94  
 
Judicial review is theoretically the best option. Bearing in mind that practical 
considerations will mean that judicial review is an unlikely change to be made in the New 
Zealand system, due to our commitment to parliamentary supremacy. In theory, a robust 
system of policy processes, legislative checks, and judicial review would be in place.  
 
4 Subjectivity and having the final word  
 
It is possible to argue that rights issues are essentially subjective. That checks and 
balances all eventually result in a politician or judge making a subjective call as to where 
to draw the line between two conflicting rights. This raises the issue of which arm of 
government is better placed to make the final call. Are politicians inherently better placed 
as elected officials? Are judges inherently better situated, as they are charged with 
making principled and objective decisions? If politicians are held to account by a 
majority surely they are badly placed to protect minority rights, and minority rights are 
usually the ones infringed upon. Or are politicians as democratically elected 
representatives the better option, not judges who bias is accountable to no one?  
 
I believe that the political culture of compromise is worth raising as an issue.  
‘Swallowing dead rats’ is not something a judge is every required to do.  Political 
positions on any issue turn on the whim of the electorate. It is not desirable to have rights 
subjected to policy cycles. Therefore the impartiality of judicial review does have a place. 
When considering who is best placed to have the final word, it becomes obvious that 
there are compelling argument against both Parliament and the judiciary. But the fact is 
judicial review is that is doesn’t necessarily need to be a better system for determining 
rights, it just needs to act as a check or balance on the existing, parliamentary based 
system.  
 
All rights must have inherent limits. They are not infinite, because one right must end 
where another starts. Therefore there issue is determining the ‘right’ place to draw an 
invisible line in the sand. Our sense of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ changes as issues of social 
  
94 Hiebert, above n 45 at 116.  
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justice come and go. For example Ireland recently voted in marriage equality by popular 
referendum, compared to their stance 20 years ago it become apparent how dramatically 
our perception of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ can change within a generation. So essentially any 
limitation of a right will be decided upon by a person who is influenced by not just their 
immediate environment (whether politics, or the justice system) but also by the time that 
they live in, and their personal perspective on it. This is influenced by issues such as their 
social background and education. Therefore it is in the best interests of society to have 
people who are diversely representative, principled, unbiased, and hopefully immune to 
external pressures. Judges may be less diverse, but they are more independent. Arguably 
judges are better situated (politically and intellectually) to engage in principled decision-
making.”95 
 
However the essence of the problem is not whether a truly democratic society needs 
judicial review, or whether it remains truly democratic with a system of judicial review. 
Regardless of difference in opinion on judicial review, we can all agree that ideally a 
system would develop which minimizes the need for any law or personal grievance to get 
so out of hand that it requires judicial review. Ideally the processes (legislative and 
political, including policy development) that contribute to the system of governance 
evolve in such a way that enables the nurturing of all rights and freedoms in a reasonable 
manner. This thereby minimizes the negative effects of either judicial review or 
parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
5 Judicial review and policy processes 
 
It is worth noting from an academic perspective that assessment of the reasonable 
limitations on a right, which is present in both the New Zealand and Canadian 
jurisdictions are an odd thing to foist upon judges, as is done in the Canadian system.96 
They have no particular expertise in this area, and this task is closely related to policy 
analysis. It requires an assessment of the merits of legislation from the perspective of the 
policy’s conceptualisation and drafting. Policy-making requires multiple objectives to be 
addressed. This is an inherently a discretionary exercise. It is possible to argue that judges 
stepping outside their usual role, because someone has to do it and hopefully they’ll bring 
their objective and principled views to the situation. But the argument that social policy 
considerations are the preserve of Parliament as elected representatives also has merit.  
  
95 Hiebert, above n 45 at 118.  
96 Hiebert, above n 45 at 121.  
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It is possible to reframe the argument. Who has the final say is not necessarily the 
paramount issue for the smooth running of a democratic society. Instead we should 
consider if the balance of power is right. Are all the separate functions of governance 
being held appropriately to account by the others? The Canadian Charter’s provision for 
judicial review of policy processes is fascinating from this perspective. It shines a light on 
an often overlooked area in the corridors of power, and makes it not only open to public 
scrutiny, but open to judicial condemnation and potential nullification. The requirement is 
“that the policy be reasonable under the circumstances.”97 Here the court seems to have 
essentially developed their own tests, which gives the safeguards a rather circular and 
self-fulfilling feel. The courts have outlined their task as considering whether the ways 
and means of policy are appropriately designed, not asking whether the policy objectives 
themselves are acceptable. 98 
 
There a two points to be made here. The first is that this makes it very different to 
conceptually distinguish between the subjective and discretionary considerations that 
shaped the policy decision, and the exercise that takes place in the courts. This raises and 
interesting legal point as to whether this is the role of a judge. Does this add weight to the 
suggestion that these decisions are the exclusive right of the executive? Should judges 
sometimes be allowed to make decisions in this manner? Are we simply being obtuse or 
willfully blind in suggesting that judges do not make subjective decisions which are often 
influenced or guided by social policy in the ordinary course of their work? Or is it 
generally undesirable but to be allowed in the context of rights cases? 
 
The second point is that having a court of law able to review the policy decisions of the 
Executive would put tremendous pressure on what is generally a quiet undertaking. 
Policy design is not an obvious area of power and influence, but none-the-less policy 
makers do have extraordinary power. Governments who front the policies that are held to 
account by the electorate, but it is an interesting point to consider the possibility of 
increased accountability for policy-makers as well. 
 
There is an argument to be made in the long term for revisiting the idea of judicial review 
in New Zealand. It is possible that there is potential compromise between New Zealand’s 
commitment to parliamentary supremacy and the strengthening of judicial review. As 
Waldron acknowledges, there is a ‘soft’ judicial review that even he is not opposed to. It 
  
97 R v Chaulk (1990) 3 SCR 1303 at 1343.  
98 Hiebert, above n 45 at 122.  
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may be possible to extend the powers of the court when making a declaration of 
inconsistency. If the courts had the power to force Parliament to reconsider an act they 
deem to be inconsistent with the NZBORA, this would serve as a check on their power 
without removing the principle of parliamentary supremacy.99 It would also raise the 
political cost of limiting the right, discouraging Parliament from doing so. 
 
M Parliamentary Scrutiny  
 
Parliamentary scrutiny is often raised as safeguard by academics and the judiciary, or as a 
potential forum for a constructive contribution to be made.  Boscawen v Attorney General 
states “Where there are differencing views on possible inconsistency with NZBORA 
rights as to whether any limitations on any NZBORA right is justified in a free and 
democratic society, it is appropriate that those issues should be debated in Parliament.”100 
Issues when they arise should be debated in Parliament. However the effectiveness of 
parliamentary debate as a safeguard for rights is also somewhat dubious. A minority in 
Parliament does not have the power to amend legislation. Simply having a member raise 
an issue in Parliament does not mean anything will be done about it. Arguably Parliament 
doesn’t scrutinize anything. The highly partisan atmosphere values point scoring above 
robust debate, because that has a greater bearing on the political maneuverings taking 
place. A law put forward by the executive cannot be changed without majority support. 
Lack of quorum requirements and party voting systems mean that the number of 
members actually in the house can be alarmingly low. A speaker is allocated a certain 
amount of time, and if it is politically expedient (for example, when filibustering 
legislation) a seasoned member can get though most of a speech before they even begin 
to address the subject matter. There can be very few members listening to any given 
speech, and while it will then be recorded in Hansard, this publication is not exactly 
widely read. Depending on the time of day and subject matter being debated, the press 
gallery may or may not have anyone in it. A journalist may or may not be inclined to 
draw attention to a point made by a member. It is hardly the robust debate and public 
scrutiny it is often portrayed as by academics.  
 
New Zealand has a very low quorum requirement. It is necessary to have a minister in the 
Chamber, and the Speaker of the House.101 Ordinarily you would also require a member 
  
99 I am indebted to the Hon David Parker for raising this idea.  
100 At [16]. 
101 Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2014, SO 40.  
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to speak. This member can be the Minister in question, so it is hypothetically possible for 
the House to be in session while a minister speaks to a room empty but for the Speaker. 
The length of time they speak for depends on the debate rules at the time. But at the 
committee stage the Minister could continue to seek calls for as long as he or she wished, 
provided the Speaker did not decide the content was becoming repetitive.  
 
Hiebert makes an interesting point in relation to the power dynamics of the Canadian 
Parliament, which I believe is equally applicable to most democracies.  
 
“Parliament is not generally a forum where independent members engage in robust 
philosophical debates in a principled, non partisan, manner. Rather, it is a weak 
institution where the structure of power ensures that members assume a subordinate 
role, disciplined along party lines in which issues are dealt with in an adversarial 
format that assures that the resolution to multi-faceted conflicts can be reduced to 
two viewpoints – in favour and opposed.102 
 
Whilst this is a fairly damming assessment of a democratic institution, it is not 
inaccurate. The purpose served by parliamentary debate is one of political power 
play, not a principled and nuanced discussion. This is partly the fault of the highly 
competitive and rather brutal nature of politics. This observation is in no way meant 
to undermine the value of parliamentary debate in the wider scheme of democracy, 
simply to outline that it is and blunt instrument not suitable for the purpose at hand.    
 
N Human Rights Select Committees 
 
After dismissing parliamentary debate as a potential help, it is important to consider 
select committees. England has the Joint Committee on Human Rights.103 Canada has the 
Senate’s Standing Committee on Human Rights.104 Australia has the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Human Rights established by the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) 
Act 2011.105 Select committees are a mechanism by which business before the House is 
considered in greater depth than would ordinarily be possible through parliamentary 
debate.  
 
  
102 Hiebert, above n 45 at 125.  
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Australia’s Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights was established by the 
Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011.106 In New Zealand they could either 
be established by a bill, or by passing a motion in the house to that effect.107 As such they 
would be extremely easy to put into action.  
 
The main consideration is whether a human rights select committee would have any 
substantial effect. It would be subject to the same pressures as parliamentary debate. A 
select committee has proportional representation of the parties in Parliament.  As such the 
governing party has the chair and often deputy chair of a committee, and a majority on it. 
So while opposition MPs are given the opportunity to consider the human rights 
implications of a bill closely, and they can file a minority report as part of the select 
committee report that would be presented to the House. However any concerns would 
already have been recorded in Hansard at first reading, and this process would not 
materially alter the balance of power enough to be effective. The same concerns 
previously raised about partisan politics would apply here. The concerns raised about the 
conflicting roles of the Attorney-General apply to government members (who hold the 
majority on the committee) who would be juggling two hats, as a member of the 
governing party trying to pass the bill, and as an objective assessor of human rights.  
O Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, our current system of reporting on potential breaches of the NZBORA is 
open to exploitation. It is a system that depends entirely on the discretionary opinion of 
one person. This person is dealing with duties that often directly conflict. The 
NZBORA’s greatest power is the pre-legislative influence to produce a bill that complies 
with the NZBORA, as opposed to its ability to prevent limitations on human rights.  
 
Judicial review and human rights select committees have the potential to contribute to a 
robust system of human rights analysis. However given the current state lack of appetite 
for change in New Zealand, attention is best focused on the policy process. This is an 
area where there is both room for improvement, and remarkable flexibility in 
implementing it.  
 
New Zealand would benefit from an integrated human rights analysis process starting at 
the policy determination stage. The positive effects of this would be amplified by an 
  
 
107 Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2014, SO 184.  
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independent body established to provide guidance and reports on the compliance of 
ministries to the new system. This would be best achieved through the implementation of 
HRIS’s, which would be easily adaptable from the existing RIS processes. This change 
would require some additional funding as existing ministries expand their human rights 
analysis capacity, but it is not significant enough to be prohibitive. Establishing an 
independent body to review HRIS’s would be more costly, but once again the cost is 
unlikely to be prohibitive.  
 
In the long term it may be possible to consider a version of ‘soft’ judicial review to serve 
as a check on the power of Parliament and the executive. It is possible to find a 
compromise between the principle of parliamentary sovereignty and the necessity of an 
external check on the power of Parliament.  
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